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INTRODUCTION
Law professors fondly observe that the law is always catching
up with technology. What else could it do? Legislators could
hardly be expected to anticipate scientific discoveries.
Technological foresight is rarely a campaign promise or the basis
for selecting elected officials. Judges are rarely experts in science
and engineering. Gone are the days of Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Rush, when scientists and
inventors were also lawgivers.
Is there, however, something insightful we can gather from
the oft-noted, and facially obvious, observation that regulation
follows invention? Perhaps by looking at why earlier invention
sparked regulation, we can understand whether, or how, modern
invention will produce legal limits.
* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law, J.D. University of
Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D. Yale Law School.
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The question has particular relevance for the rapidly
emerging methods of modern communication. The recent pace of
development in communication technology leaves privacy interests
in the new media considerably unprotected by comparison with
traditional means of communication. The government must jump
over considerably more legal hurdles to listen in on telephone
conversations than it does to obtain e-mails or discover where a
cell phone user traveled.1
The gap between emerging technologies and laws protecting
privacy interests in those communications is hardly new. Few
technologies have seen explosions both in sophistication and
widespread use as electronic communication. For America’s first
century, methods of communication did not change, though the
speed and reliability of the ordinary mail improved substantially
over the period. 2 Then, and almost overnight, communication
technology took a great leap forward as telegraphs, and soon
thereafter telephones, became commonplace in major cities.
Roughly a century later, another revolution occurred in the way
society communicates.
Lawmakers anticipated privacy concerns in e-mails, texts,
and instant messages no better in the twentieth century than
their counterparts in the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century
government investigators were able to obtain the contents of
telegrams with simple subpoenas, subject to effectively no judicial
supervision. 3 Likewise, early twentieth-century police officers
were not required to receive authorization to intercept telephone
calls. 4 However, the law did eventually “catch up” with technology
as limits were placed on the government’s ability to intercept
telegraph and telephone communications.5

Haley Plourde-Cole, Back to Katz: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the
Facebook Age, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 589 (2010).
2 Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf is not Always in for a Cow: An Analysis of the
Constitutional Right of Anonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 527, 536 n.24 (2002) (citing CARL H. SCHEELE, NEITHER SNOW NOR
RAIN . . . : THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES MAILS (1970)).
3 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, America’s First Wiretapping Controversy in Context
and as Context, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 205, 216 (2011).
4 Id. at 234-35.
5 Id. at 226-31 (describing protections in telegraph communications); Neal Katyal
& Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA
1
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It is not clear that the law will do the same in the twentyfirst century. Much has changed since our last communications
revolution roughly a century ago. The interest groups that shaped
privacy expectations after our first communications revolution are
not as powerful as they were a century ago. The American Civil
Liberties Union, for instance, does not have the influence
organized labor had in the early twentieth century. Corporate
privacy advocates have also changed. Today, they come with
unclean hands. Telephone and telegraph companies argued for
their customers’ privacy against government intrusion.6 Providers
of modern communications services argue for their customers’
privacy from the government, but while selling customers’
information to advertisers for a fee. 7 The history of communication
technology, and its protection from the government’s prying eye, is
relevant to predicting how the law will regulate recent
innovations. Telegraph communications offered the first
alternative to the existing and quite slow method of getting
messages from one place to another. Remarkably fast Pony
Express riders could get letters from St. Louis to California in
eight days, beating the pace of stage coaches by twelve days.
Telegrams, by contrast, permitted messages to travel thousands of
miles almost instantly.

I. HISTORY AND EXPANSION OF TELEGRAPH COMMUNICATION
Samuel Morse conceived of the electromagnetic telegraph in
1832, built an experimental one in 1835, and constructed a truly
practical system in 1844.8 Telegraph technology achieved
“commercial practicability” in major eastern cities between 1845
Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1041-47 (2008)
(describing emerging protection of telephone privacy).
6 See United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 908 (E.D. Mo. 1876) (first of a number
of cases in which Western Union challenged a subpoena for disclosure of the contents of
telegrams); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
598 (2009) (describing amicus brief of telephone companies in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
7 See Cade Schmidt, Google Doesn’t Do Data Mining; Er, Is That a Joke Too?,
REGISTER (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/23/schmidt_on_
colbert/.
8 The Morse Telegraph, HISTORY WIRED: A FEW OF OUR FAVORITE THINGS,
http://www.historywired.si.edu/object.cfm?ID=306 (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
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and 1846.9 Messages could be conveyed across the Atlantic Ocean
by this device by 1858. 10 Telegraph messages, however, remained
a tool for commercial transactions or highly important personal
communications as these messages were billed at high rates by
the syllable.11 These messages were also, by definition, less than
completely private. Regardless of any laws designed to ensure
privacy of the customer’s messages, it was inevitable that at least
the operator and transcriber would know the contents.12
With the invention and widespread use of telegraph and
telephone technology, it was initially assumed that the
government had complete access to any message passed across
these media. The sender revealed the contents of his message to a
third party, the telegraph or telephone carrier, and thus lost his
expectation of privacy in the messageat least he lost his
expectation from government intrusion. High profile government
intrusions on these forms of communication outraged the
providers of these new forms of technology, as well as their
customers, who had reason to fear that sensitive information
might be intercepted.

II. GOVERNMENT INTRUSION OF TELEGRAPH TECHNOLOGY AND
SOCIETY’S REACTION
Though telegraph technology was available from the midnineteenth century, it was expensive and rarely used. The Civil
War awakened potential customers to the value of instantaneous
communications. Military commanders used the wires to transmit
orders and reporters used the wires to relay news. 13 Civilian use
of telegraphs increased dramatically after the war. 14
9 Richard B. DuBoff, Business Demands and the Development of the Telegraph in
the U.S., 1844 to 1860, 54 BUS. HIST. REV. 459 (1980).
10 This system, however, broke down after two works of operation and would only
be restored after the Civil War. RICHARD F. SEKER, CIVIL WAR AMERICA 58 (2006).
11 Oliver, supra note 3, at 234.
12 See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 577-78 (2007).
13 LEWIS COE, THE TELEGRAPH: A HISTORY OF MORSE’S INVENTION AND ITS
PREDECESSORS IN THE UNITED STATES 51-65 (2003).
14 Richard R. John, Recasting the Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age,
in A NATION TRANSFORMED BY INFORMATION: HOW INFORMATION HAS SHAPED THE
UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 55, 81 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.
& James W. Cortada eds., 2000); U.S. CONG., REPORT ON POSTAL TELEGRAPH 10 (1884).

2012]

CHANGING FACE OF PRIVACY ADVOCATES

975

The value of eavesdropping on this method of communication
that came of age during the war was also quite apparent.
Intercepting military messages became a matter of deadly sport.
For obvious reasons, there was no expectation of privacy in these
communications. Messages were sent in code because of the high
likelihood of interception. 15 The coded messages were often
published in newspapers where the public’s assistance in
deciphering these messages was sought. 16
After the war, government investigators quickly discovered
the value of the medium that required information to be disclosed
by the sender to the telegraph company. With the end of the
hostilities, they did not have to be as crafty as the military spies
who intercepted telegraphs. Permanent records of messages
remained in the possession of telegraph companies. 17
Investigators merely had to obtain access to these records to
determine messages had been exchanged.
Investigations early in the telegraph era revealed that
telegraph customers had considerably less expectations of privacy
than postal customers. Some of these investigations were very
low-tech. During the impeachment proceedings against President
Andrew Johnson, Congressman Benjamin Butler sent private
detectives to indiscriminately seize copies of thousand of
telegrams passing in or out the telegraph offices in Washington
and Baltimore. 18 Some of the telegrams were seized to
substantiate the charges against Johnson. 19 Following his
acquittal, Butler used the telegrams to support his claims that
Kansas Senator Edmund Ross had been bribed to vote for
acquittal. 20

15 DAVID HOMER BATES, LINCOLN IN THE TELEGRAPH OFFICE 49-67 (Univ. of Neb.
Press 1995) (1907).
16 TOM WHEELER, MR. LINCOLN’S T-MAILS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW ABRAHAM
LINCOLN USED THE TELEGRAPH TO WIN THE WAR 100 (2006).
17 1855 Pa. Laws 531 (requiring telegraph operators “to preserve the originals of all
[telegraph] messages sent from such office . . . for at least three years . . . .”); see
generally MORRIS GRAY, A TREATISE ON COMMUNICATIONS BY TELEGRAPH 115 (1885)
(explaining the rights of action against telegraph companies because in order to be
criminally liable under the statute there must be a right of action).
18 DAVID J. SEIP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1978).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 31.
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Government investigators after the impeachment did not rely
on such thuggish tactics to obtain telegrams. A subpoena duces
tecum for telegrams provided the imprimatur of judicial
authorization without any meaningful oversight of a court. Most
states had statutes forbidding a telegraph company from
disclosing the contents of a message to anyone but the intended
recipient, but the statutes, on their face, largely left unclear
whether these messages could be disclosed to criminal
investigators or courts. 21 Courts never construed these statutes to
limit the scope of the subpoena power.
The use of a subpoena, as opposed to Benjamin Butler’s
methods, provided the nation’s primary telegraph company an
opportunity to object to the seizure of copies of telegrams before
the fact. The first high-profile objection to complying with a
subpoena for telegrams involved an allegation of political
corruption. Federal prosecutors suspected that President Ulysses
S. Grant’s personal secretary, Orville Babcock, was tipping off St.
Louis distilleries about raids to discover tax evasion. 22 They
obtained a subpoena for all the telegrams sent between Grant’s
secretary and a revenue agent in St. Louis for an eight-month
period. 23 In modern criminal cases, we are accustomed to the
defendant seeking to prevent the prosecution from using evidence
on the basis that his privacy rights have been intruded upon. 24 In
these early telegraph subpoena cases, the telegraph company

See HENRY HITCHCOCK, INVIOLABILITY OF TELEGRAMS: A PAPER READ AT THE
SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 26 (1879) (observing
that only Missouri and Indiana had laws prohibiting telegraph operators to divulge the
contents of telegrams but expressly provided an exception when the information was
requested by a court). Hitchcock’s otherwise excellent research appears to have omitted
at least one state, Pennsylvania, which had a similar exception. 1855 Pa. Laws 531.
22 ROY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE CENTURY: RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL
TILDEN, AND THE STOLEN ELECTION OF 1876 at 25-26 (2003).
23 United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 908 (E.D. Mo. 1876).
24 In fact, in the modern era the telegraph company would lack standing to object
to even an illegal search that produced evidence against one of its customers. See
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980) (even egregious trespass upon
privacy and property interests of bank’s employee does not provide remedy for bank’s
customer); see also Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the
Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 296-97 (1998) (criticizing Payner and
three other cases that established a standing rule permitting the exclusionary rule to
apply “only [to] the person whose Fourth amendment right” was disregarded).
21
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itself objected to producing information that could be used to
incriminate its clients.
Western Union, obviously attempting to assure its customers
their privacy would be protected, objected to such a sweeping
request for telegrams. 25 The telegraph company argued that the
government had not shown the information they sought could be
found within these documents. Their arguments dealt both with
the degree of suspicion required to obtain the documents and the
amount of specificity required of the request. 26 A vast amount of
their customers’ private communications would be delivered to the
government with such requests. The federal court rejected
Western Union’s concern, requiring only that subpoenas identify
needed telegrams “with that degree of certainty that is
practicable[;]” a criterion the court found satisfied by the
government’s request in this case.27
Three years later, a congressional committee investigating
the Presidential Election of 1876 issued subpoenas for an untold
number of telegrams identified only by parties and a wide range of
dates. 28 With the election too close to call, and allegations of fraud
and voter intimidation in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina,
a congressional committee subpoenaedamong others thingsall
telegrams sent to or from eight prominent Louisiana Republicans,
all suspected of involvement in voter fraud. The subpoenas for
these men covered a four-month period. 29
As it had done in the Babcock case, Western Union opposed
the subpoenas for the telegrams. The testimony of the telegraph
operator assigned to the New Orleans office was read before the
congressional committee:
I am instructed that a judicial or other subpoena couched
in such general and sweeping terms would be in legal
effect a general warrant, within the prohibition of the
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and subject to the condemnation of the great
25 Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1892, 1901 (1981).
26 Oliver, supra note 3, at 221-22.
27 Babcock, 24 F. Cas. at 909.
28 44 CONG. REC. H452 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1877).
29 Id.; MORRIS, supra note 22, at 175-85, 192-99, 203.
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principles of personal liberty and private right established
for all freemen of the Anglo-Saxon race by the celebrated
judgments of Lord Camden in Wilkes’s case, and the case
of Entick v. Carrington . . . . 30
The committee rejected Western Union’s argument,
concluding that customers’ privacy interest in the contents of
telegrams did not defeat the superior interest of the government
in discovering information. 31 The committee further rejected the
analogy to general warrants.32 The subpoena itself was beyond
constitutional challenge, according to the committee’s reasoning:
“[I]n the hundreds of instances in which the subpoena duces tecum
has been resorted to . . . the similarity which the witness supposes
to exist between that writ and the ‘general warrants’ condemned
by the constitutional provision cited by him has never yet been
detected.” 33 Of course, it was not the subpoena itself, but the use
made of the subpoena, that Western Union claimed amounted to
an indiscriminate search forbidden by the Constitution. 34
Western Union continued to argue against requests for all
telegraph communications passing between identified persons. 35
In 1878, a state grand jury in St. Louis issued a subpoena for all
the telegrams sent between four named persons over a fifteenmonth period.36 Western Union objected that such requests
violated the federal and Missouri Constitutions’ prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures.37 This time, the Missouri
Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Brown, accepted Western Union’s
position.38 The court concluded that Missouri’s constitutional
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures required that a
subpoena:
[S]hall at least give a reasonably accurate description of
the paper wanted, either by its date, title, substance, or
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

44 CONG. REC. H454 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1877).
44 CONG. REC. H603 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1877).
Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 604.
Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 90 (Mo. 1880).
Id.
Id. at 93.
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the subject it relates to . . . . To permit an indiscriminate
search among the papers in one’s possession for no
particular paper, but some paper, which may throw some
light on some issue involved in the trial of some cause
pending, would lead to consequences that can be
contemplated only with horror, and such a process is not to
be tolerated among a free people. 39
The Brown particularity requirement, zealously advocated
for by Western Union in a variety of settings, became the standard
for telegram subpoenas throughout the nation. 40 The telegraph
company’s continued zealous advocacy led courts to fashion some
protections from the government’s ability to know the content of
all telegraphed communications.

III. HISTORY AND EXPANSION OF TELEPHONE TECHNOLOGY
One might imagine that late-nineteenth-century legislatures
anticipated the possibility (or probability) that government
investigators would have a similar interest in discovering the
contents of telephone calls. Yet laws meaningfully protecting
privacy in telephone conversations did not accompany this
innovation in communication technology.
The telephone, just a few decades behind the telegraph, both
in invention and widespread availability, gave ordinary
Americans access to immediate communications. Alexander
Graham Bell’s telephone was first displayed at the 1876 World’s
Fair in Philadelphia. 41 Two years later, the first telephone
exchange opened in New Haven, Connecticut, and within a few
Id. at 94.
See Desai, supra note 12, at 582 (observing that after Brown, courts generally
required specificity in warrants analogous to that required by the Missouri Supreme
Court). While the United States Supreme Court recognized in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886), that the Fourth Amendment protected citizens from
subpoenas for the production of their documents, subpoenas for telegraphed messages
continued as those holding the records of those messages, either custodians of
corporate records or telegraph offices, had no privacy or property interests in the
contents of the messages. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 488 (1913);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Ex Parte Gould, 132 S.W. 364, 374-80
(Tex. Crim. App. 1910).
41 CHERYL GANZ, THE 1933 CHICAGO WORLD’S FAIR: CENTURY OF PROGRESS 79
(2008).
39
40
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years, telephone service was available in every major city in the
country. 42 Customers were much more willing to use telephones to
communicate than telegraphs. 43 Initially, subscribers were
permitted unlimited use to encourage them to transfer to this
method of communication from the telegraph service that billed by
the message. 44 By the 1890s, callers paid for the amount of their
individual usage. 45
Telephone conversations provided an immediate response,
unlike the telegraph which required a chain of delivery and a wait
period for a response. Telephones, at the turn of the twentieth
century, had made instantaneous communications accessible to
the masses. 46

IV. GOVERNMENT INTRUSION OF TELEPHONE TECHNOLOGY AND
SOCIETY’S REACTION
Laws written to ensure privacy in telegraphs were poorly
adapted to account for the new technology of the telephone. In
New York, for instance, statutory provisions prohibited
interception of telegraphs and forbad telegraph companies from
disclosing the contents of a telegram to anyone but the intended
recipient. 47 Telegraph companies were also forbidden to send
messages that constituted or furthered a crime and were required
to forward such messages to law enforcement authorities. With
the development of telephone technology, the legislature simply
added the words “or telephone” and “telegraph.” 48 While it was
theoretically possible for telegraph operators to identify criminal
messages before sending them, it was simply not possible with the
telephone. Late nineteenth-century lawmakers lacked even this
42 JOHN E. KINGSBURY, THE TELEPHONE AND TELEPHONE EXCHANGES: THEIR
INVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT 267 (1915).
43 Id. at 473.
44 Id.
45 Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 22, at 23 (explaining that prepaid message
requirements were likely to be considered a reasonable telegraph company regulation).
46 See AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, TELEPHONE STATISTICS
OF THE WORLD 8-13 (1912) (describing that telephone use in the first decade of the
twentieth century increased nearly ten times more rapidly than telegraph use).
47 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 641 (McKinney 1881).
48 1895 N.Y. Laws 518 (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.35(1) (McKinney
2008)).
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basic insight and had not learned othermore subtlelessons
from investigations involving telegrams. It should have been
foreseeable that law enforcement would have an interest in
learning the contents of telephone conversations, just as it had an
interest in discovering the contents of telegrams. The laws
nevertheless forbid any interception, whether by law enforcement
or others.
Despite these laws, just as with telegraph technology,
government officials initially assumed there were no limits on
their ability to intercept conversations passed along the wires. The
New York City Police Department maintained a wiretap squad
from 1895 that operated in secret. 49 None of the evidence it
obtained was ever introduced in court. Information obtained from
the wiretaps was used only to aid in investigations, which kept the
program from ever coming to light. 50
A high-profile dispute in 1916 between the mayor of New
York and the Catholic charities of New York ended the secrecy of
what appears to have been this country’s first wiretapping
program. 51 In an effort to demonstrate that priests were
attempting to avoid testifying before a committee investigating
their use of city funds, Mayor John Purroy Mitchel ordered the
police department to intercept the calls of priests who were to
testify. 52 A Catholic member of the wiretap squad, having second
thoughts about eavesdropping on a priest, revealed the mayor’s

49 Seymour Wires Tapped on Order Given By Woods, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1916, at
1 (“The practice of wiretapping . . . goes back as far as 1895 . . . . The company . . .
interpreted the law to mean that it was its duty to aid and assist the public officials in
apprehending and detecting crime . . . .” (quoting John L. Swayze, general counsel of
the New York Telephone Company)).
50 STATE OF NEW YORK, MINUTES AND TESTIMONY OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS 103 (1916)
(testimony of Police Commissioner Arthur Woods), available at http://www.archive.org/
stream/cu31924083762942#page/n15/mode/2up.
51 See EDWIN R. LEWINSON & JOHN PURROY MITCHEL: THE BOY MAYOR OF NEW
YORK 179-80 (1965); Meyer Berger, Tapping the Wires, NEW YORKER, June 18, 1938, at
41.
52 Daniel Trucano, The Public Charities Controversy and John Purroy Mitchel,
Mayor of New York City, 1914-17 (Apr. 10, 1970) (unpublished master’s thesis, St.
Francis College) (on file with author).
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actions and thus the existence of the entire wiretapping
program. 53
The disclosure of the previously secret police wiretap squad
attracted considerable public attention. 54 There was an immediate
fear that every New Yorker’s telephone conversations were being
overheard. The police were able to convince the public that they
were sufficiently competent at investigation and that the phones
of few, if any, innocent persons were ever tapped. 55 Police
Commissioner Arthur Woods explained that the New York City
police were not the bumbling constables Benjamin Cardozo
described from the Framing Era.56 He explained that his
professional police department had expertise in identifying
criminals and was rarely wrong when it engaged in an intrusion
as serious as a wiretap.57
For the most part, Police Commissioner Woods’s claim that
the New York Police Department should be trusted to determine
who to wiretap seemed to satisfy New Yorkers. 58 Charges against
city officials for conducting the wiretapping were dropped. 59
Though laws were proposed in the legislature that year to limit
the ability of police to decide when to eavesdrop on telephone calls,
none passed. 60 The mayor who ran against Mitchel’s clearly
politically motivated wiretapping implemented only modest
reform. Under his administration, police only had to obtain the
approval of a prosecutor to conduct requested wiretapping. 61 Selfregulation of wiretapping thus appears to have been largely in the

53 Michael W. Clark, Mayor Mitchel, Wire-Tapping, and the Catholic Vote of 1917
in New York City 28-29 (1965) (unpublished master’s thesis, St. Francis College) (on
file with author).
54 See Oliver, supra note 3, at 239 n.207.
55 Id.
56 See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). Of course police in the 1920s
were not the constables of the Framing Era. They were considerably more powerful,
with considerably more power and incentive to consciously disregard civil liberties than
the colonial-era title constable suggested. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected
History of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 505 n.319 (2010).
57 Oliver, supra note 3, at 241-44.
58 Id. at 244-45.
59 Acquit Kingsbury for Wiretapping: In Ordering Defendants Freed Court Says
Evidence Did Not Indicate Bad Faith, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1917, at 20.
60 Oliver, supra note 3, at 245.
61 Id.
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Progressive Era, a period when the public was willing to place
extraordinary trust in the police.
The famous, or infamous, Prohibition Era Supreme Court
case Olmstead v. United States considered whether the Fourth
Amendment placed limits on the power of the government to
intercept telephone calls. 62 Not surprisingly, several telephone
companies filed amicus briefs contending that intercepting a
telephone call amounted to a search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. Much like telegraph companies before
them, they had an interest in reassuring their customers that
their privacy was being protected.
The efforts of these telephone companies were unsuccessful.
A closely divided Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect the sounds that callers transmit from their homes. 63 The
holding was destined to be short-lived. The trust the public was
willing to place in the police during the Progressive Era would not
survive Prohibition. Law enforcement during Prohibition proved
itself to be incompetent at best and hopefully corrupt at worst. At
the federal level, the United States Supreme Court quickly
reversed the effect of the Olmstead decision, holding that the
Communications Act of 1934 prohibited wiretapping, though the
language the Court was interpreting could hardly be read to
requireor even suggestthat conclusion.64 In New York State,
an unlikely interest group joined the fight against unregulated
wiretappingorganized labor.
Organized labor’s connections with organized crime made it a
target for prosecutorial investigations, prompting labor’s keen
interest in civil liberties. 65 In the 1930s, organized crime began to
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 463-65.
64 Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and
Interception of E-Mail, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 28-31 (2003) (observing
that the Supreme Court in the 1930s interpreted the Telecommunications Act of 1934
to forbid wiretapping and that Congress did not modify the statute to permit
wiretapping until the late 1960s).
65 See Oliver, supra note 56, at 521-22. William Nelson has described labor’s
support for limits on wiretapping and searches as part of a struggle between elites for
order and non-elites for security from the elite’s order-restoring apparatus. William E.
Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth Century Constitutional Law,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 22 (1995). The linkage between organized labor and
organized crime seems to provide a tighter explanation.
62
63
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infiltrate labor unions. Before Prohibition, gangs sold violence.
The use of violence and its linkage to organized crime was
certainly foreseeable, as alcohol became a legal product again.
Arnold Rothstein, the infamous gangster alleged to have fixed the
1919 World Series, made a business of selling muscle to
contending sides in labor strikes. 66 In the Garment Worker’s
Strike of 1926, he sold his product to both sides of the strike.
Prohibition then created an easy and profitable market for
contraband alcohol and made large criminal networks possible. 67
Prohibition both distracted organized crime from the violence
racket and made criminal organizations much more sophisticated.
The end of Prohibition took away the easiest source of their
income but did not destroy the criminal organizations. Bootleggers
became mobsters; former peddlers of contraband infiltrated
legitimate businesses. For a variety of reasons, organized labor
became an easy target for mob infiltration.
For legitimate and illegitimate reasons, labor was opposed to
wiretapping. Trade unions were infiltrated by organized crime in
the 1930s. 68 In New York, mob-busting prosecutor Thomas Dewey
focused on these groups.69 Corrupt unions obviously opposed his
efforts to ferret out their wrongdoing. Legitimate unions objected
to the unwelcomed government eavesdroppers itching to cobble
together probable cause for an indictment.
Labor groups specifically asked the New York Constitutional
Convention of 1938 to forbid wiretapping except when judicially
authorized.70 Their fear of government intrusion extended beyond
eavesdropping. They asked the convention to include a provision
that excluded illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials. 71
Labor interests were so powerful that not only did the New York
66 DAVID PIETRUSZA, ROTHSTEIN: THE LIFE, TIMES AND MURDER OF THE CRIMINAL
GENIUS WHO FIXED THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (2003); BENJAMIN STOLBERG, TAILOR’S
PROGRESS: THE STORY OF A FAMOUS UNION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 138 (1944).
67 STOLBERG, supra note 66, at 138.
68 EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 238
(1996); SELWYN RAAB, FIVE FAMILIES: THE RISE, DECLINE, AND RESURGENCE OF
AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL MAFIA EMPIRES 37 (2005).
69 MARY M. STOLBERG, FIGHTING ORGANIZED CRIME: POLITICS, JUSTICE AND THE
LEGACY OF THOMAS E. DEWEY 50-51 (1995).
70 4 STATE OF NEW YORK, REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3441 (1915).
71 Id.
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Constitution of 1938 require judicial authorization for a wiretap,
but the proposed provision to make the exclusionary rule part of
the Constitution barely failed in the convention. 72 The
exclusionary rule has, of course, been one of the most popularly
maligned rules of criminal procedure, comparable only with the
public’s distaste for the warnings arrestees must be given under
Miranda v. Arizona.73
At the national level, a variety of labor groups similarly
argued that Congress should forbid wiretapping. In 1941, a
variety of labor groupsincluding the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (who
were separate groups at this point)joined a host of other labor
organizations including the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, the
American Newspaper Guild, the United Federal Workers of
America, and the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in
opposing wiretapping. 74 Like their labor counterparts who
advocated limits on wiretapping in the New York Constitution a
few years earlier, these labor organizations raised generic
concerns about the power of the government to eavesdrop on its
citizens.75 The American Federation of Labor additionally
observed that unions had a unique concern. The government, as
the AFL observed, may assert an interest in strike busting in an
actual, or claimed, interest in national security. 76 Highly
influential labor groups thus joined the logical opponents of
wiretapping—telephone companies—in opposing the power of
government to intercept telephone calls.

V. THE NEXT COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION
As we enter our second communications revolution, no group
has emerged with the influence of organized labor in the 1930s, or
with the purity of interest of Western Union in the 1870s. As
before, and predictably, a gap exists between the new technology
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY
at 125-27 (2001).
73 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74 To Authorize Wiretappings: Hearing on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 34, 75, 100, 131, 171, 237 (1941).
75 Id. at 34-35, 76-77, 91-94, 131-32.
76 Id. at 35.
72

IN NEW YORK, 1920-80,
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and the law that will protect the privacy of customers using the
new technology. However, it is not clear that the gap will be filled
this time. Under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of
1986, the government can obtain access to e-mails, mobile location
information, information stored in computer “clouds,” and
information in social networking sites by demonstrating that the
information is merely “relevant” to a criminal investigation. 77
As the social world moves from telephones to cell phones, emails, texts, and instant messages, it is hardly satisfactory to say
that the degree of privacy varies with the manner of technology
chosen. As the world evolves to cell phones, the land-line holdout
cannot expect to be a part of a business and social world that now
expects everyone to carry telephone and e-mail service in a pocket
or purse. 78 As text messaging replaces cell phone calls, the person
who cannot or will not use text messaging is left out. To do
business, or be social, we must use technology not yet protected
from the government’s prying eye. Insisting on a manner of
communication with greater legal protections for ordinary
conversation is reminiscent of the television sitcom spy Maxwell
Smart’s constant insistence on using the awkward and
inconvenient cone of silence to prevent interception. 79
The use of new technology is thus, on some level, essential.
Legislative innovations to protect privacy in these technologies is,
77 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i)(III) (2006) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter
for a person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic
communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the
protected computer, if . . . (III) the person acting under color of law has reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser’s communications will
be relevant to the investigation . . . .”).
78 Justice Kennedy recognized that:

Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some
persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments
for self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case
for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices
has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who
need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and
pay for their own.
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
79 Biography for Don Adams, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0010915/bio
(last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (documenting that NBC hired Don Adams to star as
Maxwell Smart, the “bumbling yet intrepid secret agent,” in the Mel Brooks and Buck
Henry spy spoof Get Smart in 1965).
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however, certainly not inevitable. The degree of privacy we
enjoyed from government interception of telegraphed messages
(enjoyed before Western Union sent its last telegraph, that is), and
enjoy from government intrusion on telephone calls, did not
accompany these new technologies from their inception. The new
forms of communication were not initially covered by laws limiting
older forms of communication. Despite Western Union’s
arguments, telegraphs were not regarded to have inherited the
legal protections afforded items sent through the mail. Despite
statutory prohibitions on any interception of telephone calls,
government snoops were believed to have limitless powers to tap
telephones wires. Powerful advocacy groups convinced lawmakers
to extend the privacy protection to new forms of communication.
No similar groups appear on the horizon to ensure that privacy
interests in these new modes of media technology will be
protected.
No technology provider is poised to do the advocacy work of a
nineteenth-century Western Union or an early-twentieth century
Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company. Presently an
organization called Digital Due Process is lobbying Congress to
update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to
require greater protection from government intervention in new
technologies. 80 The group includes unlikely partners like America
Online, Apple, Americans for Tax Reform, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and AT&T (to take a demonstrative sample
whose sole common characteristic seems to be preserving
alliteration in the list). 81
There are reasons to believe this unlikely collection of actors
will not be successful. Unlike Google or AOL, neither Western
Union nor AT&T came to legislators or courts with unclean hands.
80 ECPA Reform: Why Now?, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/
index.cfm?objectid=26802940-3840-11DF84C7000C296BA163 (last visited Jan.. 22,
2012) (discussing the latest news on ECPA reform and related issues); see also
Gautham Nagesh, Sen. Leahy Introduces Update to Digital Privacy law, HILL (May 17,
2011, 1:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/161691-sen-leahyintroduces-update-to-digital-privacy-law.
81 Other high profile members of this organization include eBay, Facebook, Google,
IBM, and the Newspaper Association of America. See Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE
PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=DF652CE0-2552-11DFB455000C296BA163 (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
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Google, AOL, and others examine the content of e-mail messages
to sell IP addresses to manufacturers interested in selling me
quality barbeque sauce and single barrel bourbon, for instance. 82
Google, AOL, and others then are not the best champions of
liberty when they ask Congress to place limits on the
government’s ability to acquire information about drug dealing or
terrorist plots.
Similarly, there is no consumer group positioned to take over
the role that organized labor played in the privacy debates. Unlike
Western Union in the late 1800s or AT&T in the early 1900s,
organized labor’s hands were far from clean, though they may not
have been as thoroughly dirty as Thomas Dewey suggested.
Organized labor did, however, have influence in Congress and
state legislatures that the ACLU could never boast. 83
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there seems to be less
public concern over privacy at the turn of the twenty-first century
than there was at the turn of the twentieth century. Corporations
do not expect protecting privacy to be essential to retaining
existing customers and attracting new ones. Qwest alone resisted
the government’s requests to tap the international calls of its
subscribers as part of the National Security Agency’s highly
controversial wiretap program during the presidency of George W.
Bush.84
With Facebook and Twitter, Americans themselves have
grown accustomed, not necessarily to government eavesdropping,
but to broadcasting virtually every detail of their lives to anyone
who cares to surf the web. When a telegraph operator in the
nineteenth century read a message he conveyed, it was not
because the sender desired him to know the contents. When a
telephone operator, or nosey member of a party line, listened in on
a conversation in the early twentieth century, it was not because
the parties to the conversation wished to broadcast their
See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 7.
See generally About the ACLU, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/about-aclu-0 (last
visited Jan. 22, 2011) (“The ACLU also works to extend rights to segments of our
population that have traditionally been denied their rights, including people of color;
women; lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender people; prisoners; and people
with disabilities.”).
84 See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA
TODAY, May 11, 2006, at A1.
82
83
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discussion. In modern society, discussions that are seemingly
relevant to only two people appear on publically viewable
Facebook walls or Twitter feeds. Companies like Facebook, AOL,
and Google introduced us to the ability to broadcast every detail of
our lives and feed our addiction to do so.
We are no longer a private people. We live out loud. Perhaps
quite naturally, there is no one poised to vigorously represent
privacy concerns in these new technologies.
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